

8 March

- Benjans ^{tel.} Jan Nicholson
- Braunman - Elms H. Miller
- Dietrich - Feraci
- Nellie Hifford Robert
- Hada Koe
- (Styrovitensis) Sandy

Kiker stories?

- Kearns

Kronets Lasch

Margolis Kofelber

Mandelstam

[George Carroll : CIA, ISA]

Nader

Sanis

Box Fil

Met Code of Ethics
FEP

HENRY
Belger

Files from Bob

225/15.00
1350 .06

4

4

The Phoenix

Bolshun
Pontino
Johnstone

Thurs - Japan; eds
promo abroad

Fielding

I know:

- War Plans (all)
- C+C system
- Executive procedures, warning, fail-safe...
- SI
- R+D
- RD
- Heads of State letters...

NOT:

Current ops + agents -

rec processes

com/cypher processes

In "Papers" I don't bring out: growing
awareness of problem of "Hidden History"
(Loftis, Marshall, Goldham, Kranish)
+ secrecy/deception (Crimo; F.M.A.)
(Ubiassi)

May '72

Note: - my "personal file" of docs

DOD → RAND → DOD → RAND → ...

(see letter)

- circumstances under which original
who knew... purposes... need...

- docs & brought with me - or had
sent (Jones!)

Harry Harris
Rogers

Thelma Stables; Janie —

Plimpton 61-65

Burns

Tushman

Goldman 64-66

Agard
 William Barber
 Li Bangin
 Blumstein
 Herb Benington
 Joan Cleveland
 Forrestal
 Al Friedman
 Deirdre Henderson
 Bill Horban
 Hoffman
 Charles Krug
 Kiker
 Keiter
 Margolis
 Larry McQuade
 Karin Miller
 Bob Mandelstam
 Peyton Robertson
 Ross
 Steve Rinder

Peter Salbert
 Frank Seivert
 Bill Simmons
 Mark Stern
 Lion Conin
 Rufus
 Val
 Karick
 Vlad Sedovick
 Buzgarden
 Dentic
Wehler
 Kettingburg
 Bob Johnson
 Al White
Al Ferguson
 Nick Grivas
 Johnston
 Wainstein
John Wilks
 Dan Harris

Henry Harris

66

Dentel

Huntzman

Dave Hudson

Hall

Ward just

Komer

Jack Rosenthal

Joan Wallstetter

Wiener

Hallmark

Kate

Chit Cooper

~~66~~ 67

Ardibald

Dave Burke

Art Barber

Dan Oberlander

Pontius

Schatz

Peter Szanton

Bob Hard

Charly Cook

68

Martin Bailey

Kennie Dunn

Sylvia Chase

Renate

Kathy

Susan

Jan

Frankie

Meg

Longuel Kohls

Doris Kren

Pfeiffer

Schechter

Paul Schults

Andrew

Barbara Woodfill

71

Bob Mellen

Deitman

Holden

Pontus

Johnstone

From 1958-69, I was concerned

DE Test

1964 - losing (a "problem" - to stop losing - long enough to
negot. ant.)

1965 - 67 military stalemate

1967 - 69 political stalemate / bog (with side

"could" must either forward or back)

1969 - US Exe "could" not stop the crimes.

(My expertise

see POW 14-15

- gave me access to PP & on "special" basis
(intelligence system) (discretion...)
- prepared me to learn (certain)
lessons from PP (effectively learn ^{judgments} ~~the~~ ^{and} ~~the~~ ^{policy} actions)
- prepared me to judge
classifiability (advantage) of PP,
& persons authorized to receive,
need to know (AR, Congress, public)
- prepared me to judge r.d.
(though not the expert on
public sources)
- prepared me to know the
need for ~~some~~ certain kinds of
actions (outside Exe)

DE Direct

[A-7 action vs. A-6 Vol. I

(I-6, 5)

(I-8 role of Japan

Bring out: French war, US-supported

War started = 1945-46

(FDR, hist....)

Legit. of US position

(Zinn: Never a reappraisal of
necessity for US interests...)

Secret: that the reality of Indochina, apparent
to historians, journalists (mostly French;
British...) was not a secret to the Pres;
that the ~~historical~~ history in White Papers,
contradicting "outside" histories, was a lie,
itself contradicted by inside histories that
agreed with outside histories; that to rely on
the Presidents' versions, on handouts, was to be
misled, not only about reality in Indochina but about

what the Pres was told by his own
advisors.

[Would defeat of US forces have the
side? "The S.C. was handed by the
men who sent them there to be defeated,
to die & kill — and the men who kept them
there

[Is the present policy of removal
of US troops from VN — in exchange for
Pows —

Fisher:

In dictation, memory is a wasting asset. Especially with countries that are accountable to the citizens, others have to expect that details will be given to public before long — they go ahead and deal on that basis.

First draft of JFK reply to K on test ban was typed by Fisher on his own typewriter — that's how most of mine.

The stories got out — inaccurate, as the first stories usually are — so people got together and

DE Test

Decision of Oct 69 related closely
to politics of that fall (pre-Nixon
committee).

Note changed situation, Nov 69 -
May 70. (Thought I couldn't use PP till
1971, 72 or perhaps even '73). (when troop
reductions stopped, NVN reacted, Nixon
retaliated.)

then: Chen
Cambodia
RANII camp

I was told SU had been told of
threats. (+ does exist: lesson of PP
+ N expected to fool public.
(Cf. - Sealow - Ho 64

- Rust-Khank 64 on memo

(Rust denies to denote
that was ever considered, 66)

- 34A, 1964 (known to Ho);

- bombing in Laos 1964-~~65~~ 73

(not told to Congress till '68)

- Rust-Pearson, 1964

DE Test

My years on "crises" of copying:

1. Oct 1-9 69: expected to leave soon
later. (Oct 4 - Robert
Oct 17 - Mary, Robert)
2. Oct-10 - Nov 2 : getting ready for Fulllight
Test.
~~~~~ SINAY breakfast?
3. ? April 8-12, 70 - getting ready to leave  
RAND; or, FBI to move in.
4. ? June, 1970 : getting ready to leave RAND as  
consultant. (2nd week, for 30)  
(early does?) (Lions?)
5. July, 1970: getting ready to leave Rand  
entering, Mary, leave S.M.:  
(Lions?)



## D/E Testing

- Jan 64 - Aug 65 (TGR) [McN / Rust lies]  
= Vance memo on handling of 34A  
(303 Committee)

- MCG on list of atrocities (Fischel)

JTM - Army on Reprisals

- Seaborn guidance

- 34A as American ops [AUSTIN: McN test]

- JTM: provocation (see Barthelt + Weintal)  
McN - MONSTROUS

- McN '66 memo

- Taylor cables; Taylor lies; McN memo?

- NIE's, 50-60

[PUT QUOTES ON CARDS?]

- Bundy Working Group

- check all McN memos - e.g. May '67

- Check Vol I, 40-50; 50-54; 54-56

- Dis volume ("weight")



US v. ROBEL (decided Dec. 11, 1967; Warren

"Yet this concept of 'national defense' cannot be deemed an end in itself, justifying any exercise of legislative power designed to promote such a goal. Implicit in the term 'national defense' is the notion of defending those values and ideals which set this Nation apart. For almost two centuries, our country has taken singular pride in the democratic ideals enshrined in its Constitution, and the most cherished of those ideals have found expression in the First Amendment. It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties — the freedom of association — which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile."

— "precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms."



"Trustworthily"

Our Exce leaders have abused  
our trust.

At the same time, they have refused  
to trust the judgment & values of the  
public.

I disagree with much of the Exce  
Board on the trustworthiness of the  
Congress, the press & the public.



## DE Test

Toy: Conversations with DE on NLF,  
Pac. Not Expert  
his two papers

DE Not expert.

2 courses:


CN: (A) Put on background, without  
explaining.

(B) Key experience to state of mind.  
(Narrows the background)



LSB: (C) Basic bio — superficial.

John: Papers



John:

[ USMC — word for Pres  
Academic — Decision Theory.

[ Discovering that the villain is: the Boss,  
Police chief (Father)



CX.

Optimal: Fulbright after DE;  
DE testifies only up to, say,  
Oct 30; intent to join to  
Fulbright.

LBB — likes point that



□ - double  
fingerprints

DE Post

3 March 69


1. IVC9 Eval of War, US/GVN relations 63-67 ☐
- ② IVA2 Aid for France 50-54 ☐
3. IVB5 Overthrow of Diem 63 ☐
4. IVB4 Phase Withdrawal 62-64
5. IVC5 Phase I Building 65 ☐
6. IVB2 Strat Hatched Program 61-63
7. IVC8 Recaph on Pac 1965-67 ☐
- ⑧ IVA5 Origins of Hoangmy 1954-60
9. IVC9(6) US/GVN Relations 63-67 Part II ☐
- ⑩ II? US involvement in France - VM War 50-54

28 Aug 69

1. VIC3 Contacts Singapore
- ② I VN and the US 40-50 X X ☐
3. VI.C.1 Contacts 65-66 ☒
4. VIC4 Contacts 67-68 ( ? ) where? ☐
5. VI.C.2 Marigold
- ⑥ IV43 US + France's Withdrawal 54-56 X X
7. IV44 US training of VNese 54-59
- ⑧ IV44 Marines to Daang March 65 ☐



DE Syst



Henderson

27 March

His <sup>memory</sup> ~~story~~ is that initial discussion  
had with hsr/Henderson involved  
taking them to Santa Monica - hsr  
said he had approval of 1 out of 3;  
later he had 2 of 3.

I came to office several times to select  
which vols to take to S.M.

(To his memory, I didn't see any vols. till  
I had agreement to take them to S.M.

[Probable: I went to Kille, who said I  
could have access, but not to take  
them to S.M. I called hsr, who called  
M.H.H......

Probably in February.]

47 vols were not logged into TS Control  
System in Wash!

"They were limited-access docs, per  
agreement - hence they would hardly now be listed  
as access to them etc TS does."



DE Just

But none of vols that I checked  
out is March —

— is August;

47 vols?



DE Direct

Do you know whether others at  
Road had these clearances?

How many? How do you know?

[Meetings; weekly briefing; data, notes  
from BMD —

Phone number, list.

How many in county had these?



25 March

Bonnie

1. Bio
2. Summary of ~~to~~ jobs — aspects relevant to case.
3. Academic background — accomplishments.
4. Relevant experience in VN.  
(What & did — lessons learned.
5. Connection with TF study. (Did US mention this)
6. Receipt of 1-18.  
[Note: availability of others at Ranch]
7. Work on 1-18 after March '69.  
[Check on receipts]
8. Effects on me of 1-18: decisions.
9. Acts implementing decisions. (copy)



10. Identification of other "co-conspirators";  
relationships, roles.

11. Implementing plan — to get to Congress.  
[to press?]

12. Reconciliation of what + did with  
rights and laws.

13. JCS Report.

[Target as point  
of PP]

14. Hunter memo.



Friedman appellants did not raise  
issue

(Copy was made by <sup>court</sup> stenographer, not  
by defendants — thus, copy belonged to  
govt).

Facts

Improving answer

no for loss

info as retrievable? overbreadth

But in advantage though

DE

Fulligat

Moran

Running

So my judgment of  
need for Congress to have info a reasonable  
one?

[See Porten study  
+ Fulligat's efforts to get]

Gablonski — ITT (I & II) — Watergate — DE



What to ~~write~~ tell Fulllight



## DE Testing

### DE "personal file"

DOO → RAND → DOO → RAND...

That D's ; show how acquired — who knew

Docs from VN : get list : Butler, Jones...  
(Collaborator — Huddellson —

Wf RAND had to, & should have,  
acted this way...

(Missile Map — My Ph.D. thesis — need for  
Hidden History...)

Explain to jury : What if I am acquitted  
— what secrets left?



After case, bring-up:

suppose ~~the~~ acquitted, & strong by pros

1. No merit to Exce charges.
2. Jhy had expert opinion on this before indictment; th had prior opinions of Gov prosecutors... Jhy knew indictment was contrary to facts ('conspiracy'; conversion...).
3. No "good faith" by pros; expert, to charge Const + Bill of Rights (& indictment, but one is jail — on basis, - part, of conspiracy to suppress evidence, witnesses...).
4. Model of VN; PP; Watergate  
(note overlap with Watergate).



Fish: National defense interests:

"Reduce significantly the capability of the US to defend itself."

e.g.? Pearl Harbor...

N: "a US military defeat, or defeat of US allies, in SVN." ?

Fish: depends on circumstances: where, when, how

R-290



Direct

Uncertainty on VC/NVA behavior/capability  
in early 1969.

Letter, XSSM-1 - Quote Summary i.g. OB

Other "contacts":

Hoag

Kaufman

(Sallagan

( — P )

AVW

Klein (for McN)

Marshall (C/A)

Trinkel / McFarney

Brodie?

Parker (C/A)

Naith

Suspin Attack

Hitch

Rosen

Enthorn



## Orint on Cross

On Koszy's intercept:

1. It was my intuition not to give out Comint.
2. (I would not have been surprised to see a codeword on this).
3. If there had been a codeword on this — possible, given badly if myot vels — I would not have copied it.
4. Absence of codeword was very convincing to me that this was not "sensitive" (exp since on its face, it was; I assumed a judgment had been made, not that a mistake had been made.).



Deidre, on HAK's loss of safe, over  
F.A. article - '61? '62?

Limited War RDT+E

Buckner

Alvarez

Ditcher / Shockley

Art of Coercion

HAK (Heaver) HAK

Jackson submarine report

Remarking

"Briefings":

- VN

HAK

Komer

(alsoop)

McG B

WPB

Kater: McN

PW

Katy

Harris

Cooper / Hill-man

RVWR

Dark Candidates

MIT

RAVO Juntus

CBS

RFE

Brande

McN/HAK/Katy/Whelan/VTM/Komer/Sylvester)

Katzman/Rosenthal

McPherson

Whispering Party

VTM

RMN/

Chet Cooper



## Direct

Reason why interviews are necessary, &  
can go beyond PP/docs:

(A) survey used to conceal some facts,  
plans, reasoning, from OSD / Sec Def or Pres

(see Whelan-Westy <sup>March '68</sup> quotes in Henry paper  
Miles, Westy

- Cables on TG (Austin) (?)

- WSEG studies

- JSCP - CST

(b) involve non-NS bureaucracy

- LBJ on that doing (Capron)  
(1964-65 Bator)

- Clifford - Congress 1968

(C) survey used to conceal facts, etc. from  
subordinates:

- letters, from McCone, Cuba II

- offensive weapons, Cuba II

- May paper, 1965

- negot

- Taylor recommendation, '61



DE Duinet

Note need for certain direct quotes from  
PP in APSA — + reasons for these;

Cite them

(note MHH reaction)

(contradicting VPK image of recommendations,  
his decisions, reasons, responsibility  
"what-is-to-be-explained")

Explain Quagmire Model

(Cite letters?!)

GET CLIFFORD ARTICLES: F. A.

Keefe, mid-<sup>70?</sup>~~67~~

(see RMN response,  
press conf.)  
to F.A. articles?)

Date of



AR

2d? Thursday?  
First night Friday night: weekday + weekend

Kimberly late: 2d night?

Oct 4



Oct 19 - Advocate, May

Kimberly?  
Thai?

- Failure to copy 9 vols of 38-vol.



Told AR about "a study" ... I was reading ...  
showed a lot of misrepresentation, his ...  
TG ... early history ...

On Sept 30 ... "you know that study -  
I've decided to put it out - do you know  
a secure xerox machine?"

AR called back right away; did it that  
night. We didn't tell me started that AR  
realized it was McN study - which he'd heard  
of from the student (had asked OE - non-  
responsive).



30 Sept - Tue

Idari on sofa

I came over and said, "Idari, look at this!"  
(AR felt "Wow.") He thought, "Oh well,  
maybe everybody around RAND shows Idari  
stuff." AR couldn't tie this to volume,  
he showed Idari his study.

Went out to Figaro's...

Linda

30 Sept - Tues

4 Oct - Saturday

19 Oct Sunday - May,

(Robert 2 - or 3 times?)



28 March 73

On facts:

- Are we getting DE's time in and out,  
1969-70?

- Did we do anything in Nov 10 - December?

- When did + first check out women from  
47- vol set?

- When - which ones?

(Note overlaid)

- When oth place?

Why: Kids / Carol

Then

Kindly

cut off markings

Storage?

Which to Fulllight - when?

What must we say of: other sets?  
oth does?

Why stay at RAND: Oct 10 - Nov 3  
Nov - March (nothing on)

Date of NYRB article?

consult March - June (RM - finds)  
June - Sept (confirm)

appears only 9 (of 13)  
vols. were copied;  
all at Kinder's;  
probably by Nov 3,  
ending by end of December.



Note lack of concentration on facts with:

Carol

hst / Marshall / AVW / Hoffman / Noog

Gillo / Halperin

Diola / Kinberg / Jhar / Roberts

McN / Gelpatrin / Bundy / HAK / Carol

Collaboran / Kershaw / Klein / Wolf

JTM / EGL / Porter / Vann / good group

McG / Matthias / Nelson

Macstein / May / Ali / Komer

McC

Halperin

See use of materials made by  
- Remstadt



See use of classified materials made by:

- Hughes; Donovan
- Schlesinger, Brennan
- Hilson (look; book)
- Hoopes  
see; hst
- LBJ; Taylor; (Rostow, later); Bonding,  
Entlawen;
- RFK on Cuba II
- Rumsfeld (Brandon) : class  
book
- Bartlett (& Alsop?)
- Gaither
- Herman Kahn
- Bill Simons : RMs, book
- (Hupston?)
- Halle — Brooking Study — APSA Paper  
(see #7)
- DE — APSA Paper
- Jerome Slater : Dem Rep (see Deper on table)
- Austin; Staver; Hallerston; Kooy & Kraslow;  
Weintal & Bartlett; Brandon; Henry  
Bartlett (& Alsop) : Cuba II. miles
- Carol Roberts : DBP
- Alsop, on Missile NIE's

see reactions  
of MHH; Kado;  
Clifford, Womke;  
W. Bundy;

Whiting  
paper



28 March 73

LCB — Do & tell:

— later deals with Fulllight

— Durin, NAC

— Taylor, Falk, etc.

10 Congress  
Goodell  
McCarthy

— Min<sup>8</sup> <sup>Tolson</sup>; Flynn

— Matthes; MCG; McC; Nelson (Stone)

— Walburt; Starn; Austin; Henry  
(Fitzgerald)

— RFR

[Full — talks on MCN; on letting others have access;  
on joining study; on getting Papers; on  
going to S.M.]



# The Delmberg Project

see 6(1)2

- 131 DE  
Propose: to increase the self-awareness of the Epic branch as to how they made decisions. "On-the-job Training"  
[Keter: Politics rather than bureaucracy; telling Pres how bureaucracy functions, how to run it, & not (Wacker papers as result?) the way to improve holding]  
so - reports to Pres are out the way to improve holding.

Attended initial meeting of Kennedy Oral History project. - pressed for it (Newstadt).

Bureaucracy conference at Rand

Crisis study

Cuba II

WSEG studies

INTEREST IN  
PATTERNS, COMPARATIVE  
ANALYSIS 6(1)4

SA to JTM

(Monte China study; WSEG; State;  
Southwest; China study EO safe:

Heads of State Correspondence  
Ball: telcons



Who knew of NYT?

IPS?

Kello - Halperin?

Folk

Butler: Alan E?     Walter Smith — files?  
"Good stuff"?     system?  
                                        clean?

Delving?

(Kaufman)

Andy Marshall

April 7, 1970<sup>37</sup> — FBI, Clean... Cambodia

Stanley to see April 7, 1967<sup>36</sup> — history to Howard  
note April — 1972<sup>41</sup> — Harpigny...

April 7, 1971: Cally - Manson party  
(McC, Nathan, MCC, NYT)



1st. 1967 (Hart)

Fullight

143 —

— Oct ~~10~~<sup>9</sup>, 1969

— Nov — 1969

— Dec?

— spring: Moose / Chan

read OE-Fullight  
testing, 1980

— April 15, 1970

— May 13, 1970

— Nov 70, San Jaz

28 Feb - Banath, Stanis, Roshin

- Jan? March?

1 March: National War College

Raymond - Shinder

2 March - Mathias



## DE Test

GA on Bradon, McIV's "mistake" in pg 65



## Nizkor + Secrecy

28 March 1973

Nixon, on Korygin intercept, to Fisk:

"Might not revelation of this intercept, have made the British more reluctant to share this type of info with us?"

Jim: "Are you aware that in the last 2 weeks the former PM of England is

Gedye — sidebar.

Harold Wilson was complaining of alleged lies by Gorman, the Gov's mistress; not about intercept (which was revealed by Nixon, not by me, except to Fulbright!)

(Could I say, "I ~~presume~~ it could not, but, or you would not have revealed it!")



DE Cross

IPS - Falk

see 83

What did he see?

✓ suspect — nothing in the indictment:

(1964; + background; + 1961)



## DE Cross

- How deal with important DE oral public statements? ("How you & probably did not make any statement you have quoted in the press + many implied by you.")
- Will be ask for my diaries, etc.?
- Do I need notes on chronology?
- How deal with repetition of questions?  
Questions whose answer is clearly logically implied by other answers.
- How answer, when "It's possible - but I don't remember" is correct?

Interviewer: mass following → cabinet member



- Jell Pres:
1. Rigidity, inflexibility of single plan.
  2. Prob of UA
  3. Prob of hitting undesired countries (China)
  4. Vulnerability of C+C
  5. Uncontrollability of nuclear war.
  6. Lack of safeguards

56-57

83-84

115- NIE '61

123

132-134

JFarms - Nassau Agreement

JSCP to Pres

Reveal: '61 NIE / Helms / Berlin

NATO DB - Dec '63

Hanoi "control"  
of VC - SE

SIOP Options

Further? / NIE's (Also)

Cuba II: U-2 photos

Cuba I (in retrospect)

(U-2)



7:30 - 8<sup>AM</sup> 4-5 PM

## DE Testimony

V

### Associations:

1. First meeting with EGL: Bundy / Angus Thorp  
(Colly, ...)

2. Brundage Group.

3. Rostow Group: 1964

4. Rostow dualism Group.

5. Working Groups, Cuba II — HSR  
Rostow  
(by DePuy (Chairman - held))

6. Briefed in VN: Komer; HAK; HCL; Katzenbach;  
Casper; ~~Belmont~~ Tolan; Weyand (WFO) W Bundy; HCB; JTM; (RMN) Seaman  
(Alsup; Shapiro; Lick;

7. Talked in VN to: Quat; Ky; Dan; Thien; Chen; Thao;  
Thang; Be Thand; Hien (Chuong; Thi) Ba; Dze

8. Oct '66 trip:

9. RAMJET

10. RAND Trustees.

IOA. No more VNs

11. National War College; (

12. 34A sign-offs.

13. Speeches. McN; Helphatna; NATO Mins; (no passport)

14. JFK Oral History; Powers



15. Vofin; Rose; Werfelaki; (Gistars); (Ramsay)  
(Weiner; Seaton; Jacobson;

16. Briefings on return: Embassies;  
(Canner) (Jason; Bill-Manning)  
Admission; Cooper; McN; WPB; Rostow; Katz; Warner

RFR; (not McC); H<sup>3</sup>; HAK; (  
(Gavin?) (Romney) ELK (trip)

17. SEADAG (withdrawn April '70)

18. Loc Fil

CFR

ISS

RAND


(AEA; ES; USMCA; USNA)

19. Partridge TF:

20. Kilpatrick study for C+C

21. United War P.O.







## Manipulation of OB

(If Hanoi is like US, they would ask —  
"What is the political-bureaucratic game  
this agency is playing with this 'estimate'?" )

- SU bombers

- SU missiles : IRBMs ; ICBMs ; rate of buildup

- SU toe air ; tanks ; dms ; mms ; mobilization

- SU growth rate ...

- NATO capabilities, troops (Klein Mission)

- VC OB ; recruiting ; infiltration ; casualties

- NVA presence (1964-65)

- ARVN numbers ; capability

"Reality" being fought over, most parties  
having agency interests in mind [but Pors is  
a powerful party — ad, & hyp — relating realistically  
[informed.]



Cross

9 March

Q: One basis for my current opinion that the release of the info in 1969 could not harm the US is that the release (to Russia) did not hurt in any way over the 4 years since then.

Could even I release to all nations does not hurt in almost 2 years.



## DE Testimony

Sept 1967<sup>7</sup>

RFK interview — compare to what I  
learned in review of NIE's in PP,  
fall of '67.

Importance of history — esp., relation to French  
see quotes of JFK, Ball  
I noted effect on me, on my views.

(vs. HAK: We make...

First quarter, 1969: My access & influence,  
& RAND'S, was at its height

(Still true even when MHN became  
a consultant: Lord, Cook, Vann ... HAK ...  
Weyland, Jacobson, ... Porter ...

I knowingly gave this up, after I knew  
strategy had to be stopped ...



## Testing

LIES: NIES showed me that White Paper was wrong:

One VN

Renewal

NLF not a response to Diem's "success"  
(in a laughal understating)

LIES: Unwillingness of advisors to report true shortcomings of the counterparts — + West's unwillingness to remove them, or report on ARVN to Pres

[Note my briefing to McG B]

"This not in Cables"

Chind - Hurnicutt Affair

(West gives Kim a SAR report)



- Tell Pres:
1. Rigidity, inflexibility of single plan.
  2. Prob of UA
  3. Prob of hitting undesired countries (China)
  4. Vulnerability of C+C
  5. Uncontrollability of nuc war.
  6. Lack of safeguards

56-57

83-84

115-

NIE '61

123

132-134

Yanov - Nassau Agreement

JSCP to Pres

Reveal: '61 NIE / Hilsbrunn / Berlin

NATO DB - Dec 62

Hanoi "control"  
of VC - SE

SIOP Options

Further? / NIEs (also)

Cuba II: U-2 photos

Cuba I (in retrospect)

(U-2)



7:30 - 8<sup>AM</sup> 4-5 PM

## DE Testing

V

### Associations:

1. First meeting with EGL: Bundy / Agency Group  
(Colby, ...)
2. Brumbaugh Group.
3. Rostow Group: 1964
4. Rostow decision Group.
5. Working Groups, Cuba II — HSR  
Rostow  
(by DePuy (Chairman - held))
6. Briefed in VN: Komer; HAK; HCL; Katzenbach;  
Casper; ~~Belmont~~ Tolan; Weyand (JFV) W Bundy; HCB; JTM; (Seamans)  
(RMN) (Alsup; Shapiro; Lick;
7. Talked in VN to: Quat; Ky; Dan; Thien; Chen; Thao;  
Thang; Be Thach; Hien (Chuong; Thi) Ba; Dze
8. Oct '66 trip:
9. RAMJET
10. RAND Trustees. IOA. No more VNs
11. National War College; (
12. 34A sign-offs.
13. Speeches: McN; Helphatne; NATO Mins; (no passport)
14. JFK Oral History: Powers



15. Vofin; Rose; Werfelaki; (Cistaro); (Ramsay)  
(Weiner; Seaton; Jacobson;

16. Briefings on return: Embassies;  
(Canner) (Jason; Bell-Manning)  
Admission; Cooper; McN; WPB; Rostow; Katz; Warner

RFR; (not McC); H<sup>3</sup>; HAK; (  
(Gavin?) (Romney) ELK (trip)

17. SEADAG (withdrawn April '70)

18. Loc Fil

CFR

ISS

RAND

(AEA; ES; USMCA; USNA)

19. Partridge TF:

20. Kilpatrick study for C+C

21. United War P.O.



Cross

9 March

Q: One basis for my current opinion that the release of the info in 1969 could not harm the US is that the release (to Russia) did not hurt in any way over the 4 years since the Cold war & release to all nations has not hurt in almost 2 years.



## DE Testimony

Sept 1967<sup>3</sup>

RFK interview — compare to what I  
learned in review of NIES in PP,  
fall of '67.

Importance of history — esp., relation to French  
see quotes of JFK, Ball  
I noted effect on me, on my views.

(vs. HAK: We make...

First quarter, 1969: My access & influence,  
& RAND'S, was at its height

(Still true even when MHN became  
a consultant: Lord, Cook, Vann ... HAK ...  
Wagensek, Jacobson, ... Porter...

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(West gives him a SAR report)




DE Testimony  
or Close

Contrast what experts said PP show,  
to what Pres and media said them  
(and say now, in some cases).



## Manipulation of OB



If Hanoi is like US, they would ask —  
"What is the political-bureaucratic game  
this agency is playing with this 'estimate'?"



- SU bombers

- SU missiles: IRBMs; ICBMs; rate of buildup

- SU toe air; tanks; dics; numbers; mobilization

- SU growth rate...

- NATO capabilities, troops (Klein Mission)

- VC OB; recruiting; infiltration; casualties

- NVA presence (1964-65)

- ARVN numbers; capability



"Reality" being fought over, most parties  
having agency interests in mind [but Paris is



a powerful party — ad, & hyp — relating realistically

[informed.]

